

Message Text

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SUBJECT:HIRC EXECUTIVE SESSION TESTIMONY

THE FOLLOWING, FOR YOUR INFORMATION, IS AN UNCLASSIFIED
VERSION OF THE SECRETARY'S EXECUTIVE SESSTON TESTIMONY
BEFORE THE HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE, ON
MONDAY, JUNE 19, WHICH WAS REQUESTED BY CHAIRMAN ZAB OCK,.
THIS VERSION WAS DELIVERED TO THE COMMITTEE ON JUNE 22
BUT HAS NOT AS YET BEEN RELEASED BY THE COMMITTEE.
(THE SECRETARY'S OPEN SESSION TESTIMONY WAS SENT BY
WIRELESS FILE)

TEXT:

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--I WANT TO PROVIDE THE COMMITTEE WITH ADDITIONAL INFOR-
MATION AND THEN TAKE YOUR FURTHER QUESTIONS.

--(SUBTITLE: THE U.S. AND THE SOVIETS IN THE THIRD WORLD)

THE LETTER FROM THE CHAIRMAN AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE
COMMITTEE MENTIONED THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN AND THE
PERSIAN GULF IN THE CONTEXT OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS AND
THE COMPETITION WHICH THIS RELATIONSHIP ENGENDERS IN THE
THIRD WORLD.

--THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN IS STILL NOT
ENTIRELY CLEAR IN THE WAKE OF THE RECENT COUP.

--AFGHANISTAN HAS FOR MANY YEARS CAREFULLY PRESERVED ITS BALANCED ROLE BETWEEN THE STRONGER STATES WHICH SURROUND IT. THIS AFGHAN POLICY HAS CONTRIBUTED TO THE PRESERVATION OF ITS INDEPENDENCE AND HAS BEEN WELCOMED BY MOST OF ITS NEIGHBORS. WE WOULD BE CONCERNED, AND THE STABILITY OF THE REGION WOULD SUFFER, SHOULD AFGHANISTAN'S POLICIES TURN AWAY FROM ITS TRADITIONAL INDEPENDENCE.

--THE PRESENT AFGHAN GOVERNMENT HAS AVOIDED DESCRIBING THE GOVERNMENT AS COMMUNIST OR MARXIST-LENINIST; THEY HAVE EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO WORK AND COOPERATE WITH ALL COUNTRIES AND TO PRESERVE THEIR NON-ALIGNED POSITION. WHILE THE SOVIET UNION'S RELATIONS WITH THE NEW GOVERNMENT ARE CLOSE AND INCREASED NUMBERS OF SOVIET ADVISORS AND TECHNICIANS ARE PRESENT, THERE ARE STRONG ISLAMIC, TRIBAL, AND NATIONALISTIC PRESSURES WORKING TO KEEP AFGHANISTAN'S POLICIES FROM TURNING FURTHER TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION. WE HAVE CONCLUDED, THEREFORE, THAT FOR THE PRESENT IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO MAINTAIN TIES TO THE NEW AFGHAN GOVERNMENT AND WE HAVE TOLD THE AFGHANS WE ARE WILLING TO DISCUSS OUR CURRENT AND POSSIBLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS WITH THEM. AT THE SAME TIME, WE WILL ALSO STRONGLY SUPPORT THE SECURITY AND INTEGRITY OF AFGHAN-
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ISTAN'S SOUTHERN AND WESTERN NEIGHBORS.

--IN THE PERSIAN GULF AREA, SOVIET POLICIES HAVE STIMULATED RENEWED CONCERN ABOUT THIS VITAL REGION. OUR EFFORTS TO ASSIST IN THE DEVELOPMENTAL PROGRAMS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION, OUR SALE OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO SAUDI ARABIA AND IRAN, AND THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF A LIMITED U.S. NAVAL FORCE IN THE PERSIAN GULF ARE ALL PART OF OUR EFFORTS TO HELP THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION PRESERVE THEIR INDEPENDENCE AND STABILITY.

--IN MY PUBLIC STATEMENT I MENTIONED SEVERAL STEPS WHICH WE WERE TAKING TO INDUCE SOVIET MODERATION IN AFRICA. LET ME ELABORATE FURTHER ON TWO OF THESE STEPS:

--AS A RESULT OF THE PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS WHICH THE PRESIDENT AND I HAVE HAD WITH THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP, WE BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIETS UNDERSTAND THE PROBLEMS WHICH THEIR ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA POSE FOR OUR OVERALL BILATERAL RELATIONS. AS I INDICATED EARLIER, OUR FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVE IS TO SEEK WAYS TO COOPERATE AND WORK WITH THE SOVIET UNION TO RESOLVE CONFLICTS AND DISPUTES PEACEFULLY. NEVERTHELESS WE ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED THAT THE-CURRENT SOVIET COURSE IN AFRICA, IF CONTINUED AND INTENSIFIED, WILL ADVERSELY AFFECT THE POLITICAL CLIMATE IN THE U.S. IT WILL ALSO RAISE DIFFICULT QUESTIONS IN OUR MINDS ABOUT SOVIET OBJECTIVES AND AT SOME POINT MAY IMPACT DIRECTLY ON OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS.

--AS I SAID IN OPEN SESSION EARLIER, THE BASIC THRUST OF OUR AFRICA POLICY IS AN AFFIRMATIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE

APPROACH TO HELPING AFRICAN NATIONS MEET THEIR PRESSING ECONOMIC NEEDS, TO STRENGTHEN THEIR ABILITY TO DEFEND THEMSELVES, TO BUILD CLOSER TIES WITH AFRICA, AND TO ASSIST AFRICAN NATIONS TO RESOLVE THEIR CONFLICTS PEACEFULLY.

--LOOKING AT OUR RECORD OVER THE LAST TWO YEARS, WE CAN TAKE SOME SATISFACTION IN THE RESULTS OF THIS APPROACH:
--WE NOW HAVE CLOSE AND STRONG TIES WITH SEVERAL GENUINELY NON-ALIGNED KEY COUNTRIES WHERE THE SOVIETS HAVE SOUGHT
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INFLUENCE FOR YEARS.

--WE NOW HAVE IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH FOUR NATIONS IN WHICH THE SOVIETS HAVE HAD VERY SIGNIFICANT INFLUENCE. WE ARE BUILDING ON THESE RELATIONS.

--WE NOW ARE IMPROVING OUR RELATIONS WITH FORMER PORTUGUESE COLONIES WHICH HAD BEEN VERY COOL TO US AT THE TIME OF THEIR INDEPENDENCE.

--AND IT IS NOT INCONCEIVABLE THAT WE CAN IMPROVE OUR RELATIONS WITH ETHIOPIA AND ANGOLA AT SOME POINT IN THE FUTURE. I WILL DISCUSS LATER THE IMPORTANCE OF ANGOLA IN TERMS OF OUR POLICIES BOTH TOWARD ZAIRE AND NAMIBIA. I WOULD ONLY NOTE AT THIS TIME THAT WE BELIEVE IT MAY BE HELPFUL TO INCREASE OUR CONSULTATIONS WITH THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT AND BEGIN WORKING WITH IT IN MORE NORMAL WAYS IN ORDER TO IMPROVE THE PROSPECTS FOR RECONCILIATION BETWEEN ANGOLA AND ZAIRE, AS WELL AS IN ACHIEVING A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT FOR NAMIBIA.

--AS PART OF OUR EFFORTS TO BOLSTER THE SECURITY OF THOSE AFRICAN NATIONS WHOSE PEACE AND SECURITY IS LEGITIMATELY THREATENED, WE HAVE RESPONDED TO SOME OF THE MORE SERIOUS PROBLEMS IN THE FOLLOWING WAYS:

--IN SUDAN, THE UNITY ACHIEVED AFTER YEARS OF CIVIL WAR IS CONSTANTLY THREATENED BY OUTSIDE-SPONSORED INSURGENTS. WE HAVE AGREED TO SELL SUDAN TWELVE F-5 FIGHTER AIRCRAFT AND SIX C-130'S.

--CHAD, WHICH IS FIGHTING TO PRESERVE ITS TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AGAINST INSURGENTS AND TERRITORIAL CLAIMS AGGRESSIVELY PUT FORWARD BY LIBYA, HAS BEEN MADE ELIGIBLE TO BUY U.S. ARMS AND RECEIVE THIRD COUNTRY TRANSFERS.

--KENYA, WHICH HAS CONCENTRATED ITS RESOURCES ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT RATHER THAN ON PURCHASING ARMS NOW FEELS THE NEED FOR BETTER PREPARED DEFENSIVE FORCES. IT WILL BE PURCHASING U.S. ARMS TO HELP MODERNIZE ITS FORCES.

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--(SUBTITLE: SPECIFICS OF U.S. AFRICAN POLICY) IT MAY BE USEFUL TO THE COMMITTEE IF I DISCUSS THE SPECIFICS OF OUR POLICY IN AFRICA ON A REGION BY REGION BASIS.

--(SUBHEADING: NORTH AFRICA) IN NORTH AFRICA OUR RELA-

TIONS WITH VIRTUALLY ALL THE COUNTRIES FO OF THE REGION ARE NOW EXCELLENT OR IMPROVING.

--WITH EGYPT WE ENJOY A CLOSE ASSOCIATION ENHANCED BY OUR MUTUAL CONCERN IN FINDING A MIDDLE EASE SETTLEMENT AND PRESIDENT CARTER'S WARM PERSONAL RELATIONS WITH PRESIDENT SADAT. TUNISIA AND MOROCCO CONTINUE TO PLAY IMPORTANT MODERATING ROLES BOTH WITHIN THE NON-ALIGNED COMMUNITY AND ON MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICAN ISSUES OF CONCERN TO THE U.S. MOROCCO IN PARTICULAR HAS CONTRIBUTED TWICE IN THE LAST YEAR TO STABILITY AND PEACE IN AFRICA BY SENDING TROOPS TO THE SHABA AREA OF ZAIRE AFTER INVASIONS BY KATANGAN INSURGENTS.

--OUR RELATIONS WITH ALGERIA HAVE MEASURABLY IMPROVED. OUR MUTUAL INTERESTS IN THE ENERGY FIELD HAVE LED TO ALGERIA'S BECOMING INCREASINGLY RECEPTIVE TO AMERICAN BUSINESS AND INVESTMENT THERE. ALGERIA'S EXPORT TO THE U.S. OF NATURAL GAS AND OIL HAS BEEN MATCHED BY THE GROWING NUMBERS OF U.S. TECHNICIANS, NEW U.S. TECHNOLOGY AND EQUIPMENT IN AGLERIA.

--LIBYA IS A CLEAR EXCEPTION TO OUR GOOD RELATIONS WITH NORTH AFRICAN NATIONS. ALTHOUGH WE CONTINUE TO IMPORT LIBYAN OIL AND HAVE MADE CLEAR TO THE LIBYAN GOVERNMENT OUR INTEREST IN IMPROVING RELATIONS, LIBYA'S STRONG SUPPORT OF THE "REJECTIONIST FRONT" IN THE MIDDLE EAST, ITS ASSISTANCE TO SOME TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS, AND ITS SUPPORT FOR INSURGENTS IN CHAD HAVE POSED SERIOUS OBSTACLES IN DEVELOPING BETTER RELATIONS.

--THE ONE REGIONAL DISPUTE IN NORTHERN AFRICA IS THAT BETWEEN MOROCCO, MAURITANIA AND ALGERIA OVER THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE FORMER SPANISH SAHARA. THE U.S. HAS REMAINED NEUTRAL, BELIEVING THAT ARAB AND OTHER AFRICAN NATIONS ARE BETTER SUITED FOR A MEDIATING ROLE. WE HAVE UNCLASSIFIED

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URGED RESTRAINT AND AN EFFORT TO FIND A PEACEFUL SOLUTION, HOWEVER, AND THE DISPUTE HAS NOT SERIOUSLY AFFECTED OUR RELATIONS WITH THE COUNTRIES INVOLVED.

--(SUBHEADING: THE HORN) OUR RELATIONS WITH SOMALIA HAVE IMPROVED AND WE ARE PREPARED TO HELP THAT COUNTRY WITH THE SEVERE ECONOMIC AND HUMAN PROBLEMS CAUSED BY THE WAR, AS WELL AS HELP MEET ITS LEGITIMATE DEFENSE NEEDS, ALTHOUGH SOMALIA UNDERSTANDS THAT OUR HELP IS CONDITIONAL UPON AN END TO SOMALI SUPPORT OF INSURGENCY IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES. WE HAVE AN INTEREST IN CLOSER TIES TO SOMALIA, BUT WE DO NOT WANT TO ENTER INTO AN ARMS SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP THERE WHICH WILL ENCOURAGE TENSION AND INSTABILITY IN THE REGION. HEIGHTENED INSURGENT ACTIVITIES IN THE OGADEN WOULD PROVIDE A PRETEXT FOR CONTINUED CUBAN AND SOVIET PRESENCE IN ETHIOPIA.

--IN ERITREA, THE ETHIOPIANS HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO CRUSH THE REBELLION OR TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE REBELS. THE CUBANS

TO DATE HAVE REMAINED OUT OF COMBAT IN ERITREA.

--WE ARE COMMITTED TO A POLICY OF NON-INTERVENTION IN ERITREA. WE WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT TO THAT CONFLICT AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET ADVISORS AND CUBAN TROOPS FROM ETHIOPIA.

--WE ARE SEEKING TO MAINTAIN TIES TO ETHIOPIA. WE HAVE DESIGNATED A NEW AMBASSADOR TO ADDIS ABABA AND WE ARE TRYING TO CONTINUE A PROGRAM OF ASSISTANCE AIMED AT MEETING THE BASIC NEEDS OF THE POOREST PEOPLE OF ETHIOPIA. THE ETHIOPIANS APPEAR WILLING TO KEEP THESE CHANNELS OPEN.

--(SUBHEADING: ZAIRE) AS IN THE HORN, ZAIRE'S PROBLEMS CAUSE GREAT HUMAN SUFFERING AND ECONOMIC HARDSHIP.

--OUR BASIC POLICY TOWARDS ZAIRE INVOLVES THE PRESERVATION OF ITS TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND ASSISTANCE TO UNCLASSIFIED

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HELP PROMOTE ITS ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STABILITY. EVEN IF STABILITY IS RESTORED IN SHABA THIS WOULD NOT MEAN THAT ZAIRE'S BASIC PROBLEMS WILL HAVE BEEN RESOLVED.

--ZAIRE'S ECONOMY CANNOT BE VIABLE UNLESS AND UNTIL THAT NATION UNDERTAKES SERIOUS AND FUNDAMENTAL ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REFORMS ALONG THE LINES ALREADY SKETCHED OUT BY PRESIDENT MOBUTU. WE AND OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES WILL STRONGLY URGE PRESIDENT MOBUTU TO ACCELERATE THIS PROGRAM AS AN INTEGRAL AND VITAL PART OF A MULTILATERAL ASSISTANCE AND STABILIZATION PROGRAM.

--ZAIRE'S OTHER MAJOR PROBLEM CONCERNS ITS BORDER WITH ANGOLA. THE SECURITY OF THIS BORDER IS CRITICAL TO ZAIRE'S ECONOMIC VIABILITY. THE REDUCTION OF TENSION ALONG THE ZAIRE-ANGOLA BORDER CAN ONLY COME ABOUT IF THESE TWO NATIONS REACH AN AGREEMENT TO RESPECT THEIR MUTUAL BORDERS AND RENOUNCE INTERFERENCE IN EACH OTHER'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. PAST NIGERIAN AND CONGOLESE EFFORTS TO PROMOTE SUCH AN AGREEMENT WERE UNSUCCESSFUL. WE WILL WORK WITH THE OAU AND AFRICAN LEADERS FOR THE RESUMPTION OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE FUTURE.

--THE AFRICAN FORCES NOW IN SHABA TO SECURE THE AREA AND TO PERMIT RETURN OF THE ZAIRIAN ECONOMY TO NORMALCY NOW TOTAL OVER 2,000 MEN. OUR OWN LIMITED COMMITMENT WAS TO PROVIDE AIRLIFT FOR THE MEN AND MATERIAL INVOLVED. WE HAVE MET THAT COMMITMENT EFFECTIVELY AND RAPIDLY; ALL OUR PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN THE LIFT HAVE NOW RETURNED TO THEIR BASES IN THE UNITED STATES OR EUROPE. WE BELIEVE THAT ALL PARTIES CONCERNED ARE ANXIOUS TO REPLACE THESE AFRICAN FORCES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WITH DISCIPLINED, WELL-TRAINED ZAIRIAN TROOPS.

--(SUBTITLE: SOUTHERN AFRICA) THE PEACEFUL TRANSITION TO MAJORITY RULE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA CONTINUES TO BE A PRIMARY FOCUS OF OUR AFRICA POLICY.

-- IT IS NOT NECESSARY THAT I REVIEW HERE THE ENTIRE
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NEGOTIATING HISTORY OF OUR RECENT EFFORTS WITH THE BRITISH
TO ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN RHODESIA.

-- WE ARE UNDER CONFLICTING PRESSURES TO ENDORSE ONE SIDE
OR THE OTHER IN THIS DISPUTE. ABROAD, MANY PEOPLE URGE
US TO BACK THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. AT HOME, WE ARE OFTEN
ASKED TO BACK IAN SMITH AND THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT.

-- IT IS NOT IN OUR INTEREST TO BE DRAWN INTO FAVORING
ONE SIDE OR ANOTHER. IF WE DID SO, WE COULD NO LONGER ACT
AS AN HONEST BROKER BETWEEN THEM. IN THE ABSENCE OF
MEDIATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES, THE CHANCES FOR A CIVIL
WAR WOULD INCREASE. WE BELIEVE THAT A SETTLEMENT IS STILL
POSSIBLE.

-- THE BROKER'S ROLE IS NOT AN EASY ONE, AS WE HAVE LEARNED
IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HERE AGAIN WE NEED THE COMMITTEE'S
GUIDANCE AS WELL AS ITS HELP IN EXPLAINING THE SITUATION
TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

-- IN NAMIBIA, WE ARE CLOSE TO A SETTLEMENT, BUT WE CANNOT
FORGET THAT MISTRUST BETWEEN THE PARTIES IS DEEP AND THAT
A SETTLEMENT MAY STILL ELUDE US. OVER THE FOURTEEN LONG
MONTHS OF NEGOTIATION WE HAVE SUCCEEDED, WITH THE VALUABLE
ASSISTANCE OF THE FRONT LINE STATES, IN NARROWING WHAT
WAS AN ENORMOUS GAP BETWEEN THE POSITIONS OF SWAPO AND
SOUTH AFRICA. ONLY A FEW ISSUES REMAIN. WE HAVE REASON
TO BELIEVE THAT THOSE CAN BE RESOLVED. THE INFLUENCE OF
THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT IN ACHIEVING A NAMIBIAN SETTLEMENT
IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT.

HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE USSR (UNDERLINE)

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-- IN THE AREA OF SOVIET AMERICAN RELATIONS THE PRESIDENT
AND I CONTINUE TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT THE HUMAN RIGHTS
SITUATION IN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY
TO CHANNEL OUR CONCERNS AND ADVANCE OUR HUMAN RIGHTS
INTERESTS. OBVIOUSLY OUR OBJECTIVE IS NOT TO SCORE
DEBATING POINTS, BUT TO SEEK MEASURABLE IMPROVEMENT IN
HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONS IN THE USSR. WE HAVE NO WAY TO
ENSURE THAT PERSONS SUCH AS SCCHARANSKIY, ORLOV, GINSBURG
AND SLEPAK ARE SPARED HARSH TREATMENT, BUT WE HAVE MADE
KNOWN TO THE SOVIETS THE ADVERSE AFFECT SUCH TREATMENT
HAS ON AMERICAN PUBLIC AND CONGRESSIONAL OPINION AND
ULTIMATELY ON OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS.

WORKING WITH CONGRESS (UNDERLINE)

-- ACHIEVING THE FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES I HAVE MENTIONED DEPENDS ON A CLOSE AND COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT.

-- WE ARE NOW FACED WITH A BROAD ARRAY OF STATUTUORY PROHIBITIONS, CONDITIONS, REPORTING REQUIREMENTS AND COMPLEX PROCEDURES. WE RECOGNIZE THAT MANY OF THE LEGISLATIVE RESTRICTIONS WHICH NOW FILL THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE LEGISLATION WERE DRAFTED IN RESPONSE TO EXECUTIVE BRANCH ABUSES OF AUTHORITY AND THE LEGITIMATE DESIRE OF THE CONGRESS TO BE MORE ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN FOREIGN POLICY MATTERS.

-- WE BELIEVE THAT SOME OF THE LEGISLATIVE RESTRICTIONS OF THE PAST CAN BE MODIFIED OR RESTRUCTURED IN A WAY THAT WILL PRESERVE THE LEGITIMATE ROLE OF CONGRESS AS AN EFFECTIVE PARTICIPANT IN THE FORMULATION OF FOREIGN POLICY. OUR GOAL IS SIMPLY TO MAKE THE PROCESS AS EFFICIENT AS POSSIBLE IN ORDER TO SERVE THE US NATIONAL INTERESTS.

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-- THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAS CONDUCTED A STUDY OF THESE CONSTRAINTS. IT IS NOW WITH THE PRESIDENT FOR HIS REVIEW. I EXPECT TO DISCUSS THE STUDY WITH HIM IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE. AFTER I HAVE DONE SO, WE WILL CONSULT WITH THE CONGRESS ABOUT POSSIBLE SHORT AND LONG TERM CHANGES.

-- WE ARE AWARE THAT IT IS LATE IN THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS TO PROPOSE MAJOR CHANGES IN THE PENDING BILLS. IN VIEW OF THIS FACT, ANY FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES WHICH WE MAY PROPOSE WILL MOST LIKELY HAVE TO WAIT UNTIL NEXT YEAR. IN THE MEANTIME, WE WILL STRONGLY OPPOSE NEW RESTRICTIONS IN PENDING LEGISLATION, PARTICULARLY PROHIBITIONS ON INDIRECT AID TO SPECIFIC COUNTRIES. WE WILL WANT TO WORK CLOSELY WITH THIS COMMITTEE IN ANY PROPOSALS WE MAY MAKE TO REVISE THE STATUTES GOVERNING ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE.

-- THE VOTE ON THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE APPROPRIATION BILL THIS WEEK IS OF CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE IN THIS REGARD.

-- THE HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE HAS CUT OVER \$1 BILLION FROM OUR \$8.4 BILLION FOREIGN AID REQUEST. IN ADDITION WE EXPECT AMENDMENTS TO BE OFFERED WHICH COULD CUT THIS SUM BY ANOTHER BILLION DOLLARS. WHILE WE WILL NOT TRY TO RESTORE THE ORIGINAL CUTS ON THE FLOOR, WE BELIEVE THAT ADDITIONAL CUTS WOULD SEVERELY DISRUPT THESE

WEASK THAT YOU VOTE AGAINST THESE CUTS AND CONTINUE TO
WORK WITH US IN GATHERING SUPPORT TO HOLD THE LINE ON
PRESENT LEVELS. VANCE

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